We investigate an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect monitoring and projects the possibility that the interlinkage of the players' distinct activities enhances implicit collusion. We show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of generous tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium, if it exists, is unique. This equilibrium achieves approximate efficiency when monitoring is almost perfect, where the discount factors are fixed.
Introduction
It is a generally accepted view in economics that when an economic agent lacks means such as collaterals to incentivize his partner, he prefers interlinking the partner's activity with his own, both of which are originally unrelated; the agent makes his activity contingent on the partner's performance to establish an implicit collusion. This paper models this interlinkage as an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, where the players' payoff functions have additively separable forms, thereby implying that there is no synergy between their activities, except in that they both happen to be carried out by the same pair of economic agents. We assume that imperfect monitoring exists: each player cannot directly observe the other player's action, but imperfectly monitors it through a random signal. In this paper, we demonstrate the possibility that the collusive behavior of the players is sustained by Nash equilibrium.
We focus on Nash equilibria that induce the players to follow generous tit-for-tat strategies; each player starts selecting a cooperative action. He selects it if he detects a good signal for the other player's action, whereas he selects a defective action with a positive probability if he detects a bad signal. This strategy may be so generous that even after observing a bad signal, the player selects a cooperative action with a positive probability. We characterize a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a generous tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium, which, if it exists, is unique. This equilibrium approximately induces efficiency when monitoring is almost perfect.
The generous tit-for-tat strategy has been studied in biology and is known to survive in computer-based tournaments. See Nowak and Sigmund (1992) . The formulation of this strategy is so simple that several authors including Takahashi (2007) have used a similar equilibrium in related literature. Since there is no synergy between the activities, the generous tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium must be belief-free, whereby each player is indifferent to an action choice at all times. This property is the driving force behind our characterization.
Since each player's generous tit-for-tat strategy does not depend on the signal for his own action, the Nash equilibrium property does not depend on whether the signals are public or private; approximate efficiency is achievable irrespective of whether monitoring is public or pricate. Significantly, the players' discount factors are not required to approach unity. This is in contrast with previous works by Ely and Välimäki (2002) , Piccione (2002), and Matsushima (2004) , who assumed that the players are as patient as possible.
3 Matsushima (1991) showed that when monitoring is private and satisfies conditional independence, it is impossible for the collusion to be sustained by a pure Nash equilibrium strategy that is independent of irrelevant information. In contrast, this paper employs generous tit-for-tat strategies that are not pure, do not satisfy the independence of irrelevant information, and do not assume conditional independence.
By assuming symmetry, we show that whenever a generous tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium does not exist, no pure Nash equilibrium other than the repetition of the defective action choices exists quite generally; it might be impossible for the players to collude as long as they do not utilize more complicated mixed strategies than generous tit-for-tat strategies. This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model; Section 3 illustrates the characterization; and Section 4 discusses approximate efficiency.
The Model
We consider a long-run relationship between players 1 and 2 in the discrete and infinite time horizon. The component game is denoted by {1,2} ( , )
denotes the set of all actions for each player Sekiguchi (1997) is an exception. For general surveys on repeated games, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006) , for instance.
signal profile   is randomly determined according to a conditional probability Let us specify the repeated prisoners' dilemma model: ( 1))( )
We denote a generous tit-for-tat strategy by i s for player i ; he certainly selects i c at 
Characterization
The following theorem shows a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of generous tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium, which, if it exists, is unique.
Theorem 1: A generous tit-for-tat strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for each
( )
, and 
The payoff for each player i induced by s is given by
which is equivalent to 1 ( )
(inequality (2)) must hold. Since player i is indifferent to the action choice at all times, we can calculate his payoff by letting him select i c at all times and the other player follow j s :
which is equality (4)
Q.E.D.
Note that the players' payoffs are determined independent of their discount factors, while each player ' i s generosity-the probability i s that he selects i c even after detecting the bad signal-depends on the other player's discount factor. The more patient one player is, the more generous is the other one. We do not require j i Y X  ; a player prefers interlinking the other player's activity with his activity that may not contribute to the welfare alone but is easy to monitor.
The Nash equilibrium property does not depend on whether the signals are public or private. We can prove the same statement as Theorem 1, even if we restrict attentions to strategies for each player that depend only on the histories of his (or her) own actions and the signals for the other player's action, i.e., even if monitoring is assumed to be private. Each player i does not need to know whether the signal for his own action is good or bad.
Approximate Efficiency
The following theorem presents a sufficient condition under which the generous tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium approximately induces efficiency when monitoring is almost perfect.
Theorem 2: Suppose that 
